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Notes
Between a Rock and a Hard Place:
The Legacy of Castle Rock v. Gonzales
LYNN A. COMBS*
A restraining order is the only legal alternative offered for protection
against domestic violence. Supposedly, police function is to serve and
protect. If the law's claimed purpose to protect is a fraud, we should
know that. If the police will take no action to enforce an order of
protection, then women need to know this before we go through the
process and make our stalker or abuser even angrier.... In my case, it
definitely was [a bad idea to get a restraining order]. My daughters are
dead. But I really believe that they could have been saved if the Castle
Rock police actually bothered to enforce the court order. I called the
police repeatedly that night. The police knew that I had a restraining
order against Simon. It was their department that served him with that
order. Orders of protection can only protect you if the police are
trained on how to handle these calls and actually take measures to
enforce the orders.
-Jessica Gonzales'
INTRODUCTION
Jessica Gonzales's ex-husband kidnapped the couple's three children
from Ms. Gonzales's front yard in violation of a restraining order
intended to protect Ms. Gonzales and her children from further domestic
abuse.' Less than twelve hours later, after police shot and killed Mr.
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2007. Special thanks go
to Professor D. Kelly Weisberg for her inspiration, guidance, suggestions, and wisdom; to Adam
Silverman for his priceless input; to my family and to my dear friend, Janice Shiffler, for their love and
support; and to the members of the Hastings Law Journal for their tireless efforts. All errors and
omissions are, of course, my own.
i. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Castle Rock v. Gonzales: Making the Court's Protection Real,
http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/gen/I32i2res2oo5o3I7.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2oo6) [hereinafter
Making the Court's Protection Real].
2. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 5-7, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796
(2005) (No. 04-278).
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Gonzales, they found the children dead in Mr. Gonzales's truck.3 Ms.
Gonzales had begged police to act to enforce the restraining order, but
officers ignored her pleas, and the result was an unimaginable tragedy.'
Sadly, this scenario is not an unusual story for domestic violence
victims. In Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, the United States Supreme
Court held that the holder of a restraining order does not have a
constitutional right to have police enforce the order.' This case highlights
a disjunction between the legal reality and the social reality that domestic
violence victims face on a daily basis. If police have substantial discretion
to determine how, when, and if they need to respond to domestic
violence victims' pleas for protection, victims might conclude their
restraining orders are worth nothing more than the paper the orders are
written on. Indeed, the force of any court order is the implicit assumption
that the executive branch will make all reasonable efforts to enforce the
order. If batterers do not fear police enforcement, restraining orders will
not deter abusers' future acts of violence. Ultimately, restraining orders
will afford victims little actual protection and no peace of mind.
These problems are not just confronting Colorado citizens but are
pervasive in jurisdictions throughout the country.6 For example, in 2005
the California Attorney General released the California Task Force
Report, detailing significant system-wide failures in California's judicial
and executive branches' protection of domestic violence victims and
prosecution of perpetrators.7  This report pointed to numerous
"problematic practices," including courts' failures to issue requisite
restraining orders, judges' intimidation of victims who seek restraining
orders, failures in record maintenance, and substantial burdens on the
3. Id. at 7-9.
4. Making the Court's Protection Real, supra note I.
5. 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2810 (2005).
6. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON LOCAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, CAL.
ATTORNEY GEN., KEEPING THE PROMISE: VICTIM SAFETY & BATITERER ACCOUNTABILITY (2005), available at
http://www.safestate.org/documents/DV-Report-AG.pdf [hereinafter CALIFORNIA TASK FORCE
REPORT]; TASK FORCE ON LOCAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, CALIFORNIA
ATTORNEY GENERAL, KEEPING THE PROMISE: VICTIM SAFETY & BATTERER ACCOUNTABILITY, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY (2OO5), available at http://www.safestate.org/documentsDVRpt_ExecSum.pdf [hereinafter
TASK FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY]; Jennifer Dieringer & Carolyn Grose, Judicial Deference or Bad
Law: Why Massachusetts Courts Will Not Impose Municipal Liability for Failure to Enforce Restraining
Orders, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 557, 557-58 (2005) (discussing the case of Karen Trudeau, whose
husband fatally stabbed her after being released without bail following his alleged violation of a
restraining order); Amy Karan & Helen Stampalia, Domestic Violence and Firearms: A Deadly
Combination, 79 FLA. B. J. 79, 79 (2005) (discussing Rose Mary Hollifield, whose husband was
released on bail despite stating his intentions of violence, subsequently violated a restraining order,
and shot Ms. Hollifield in the head); Kasi Addison, State Reviews Decision Batring Police Lawsuits,
THE STAR LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 29, 2005, at 29 (discussing the case of Erica Turner, whose
estranged boyfriend kidnapped her and her son, led police on a car chase, and engaged in an eight-
hour standoff before releasing Turner and her son).
7. See CALIFORNIA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6.
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victims once the courts issue the restraining order.8
The horrifying and tragic results of domestic violence are evident
elsewhere, as well.9 In the quarter century since domestic violence began
to garner public attention, governments have implemented numerous
policy changes, with the hopes that all levels of government and society
as a whole will take domestic violence issues more seriously and work
harder to protect the victims."
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales illuminates a startling disjunction
between the legal reality, which supports officer discretion to enforce
restraining orders, and the social reality, where domestic abuse presents
a continuing, real, and dangerous threat to victims. In spite of the
progress made in the past thirty years, abuse victims still face significant
obstacles. In fact, victims are forced to fight an uphill battle every day
that has become even more difficult in the wake of Castle Rock. Castle
Rock represents a step backward for abuse victims who rely on
restraining orders, and the police enforcement of those orders, to provide
some level of comfort and security for victims and their families.
Governments must reevaluate their domestic violence laws and policies,
with an eye toward the problems raised by Castle Rock, to ensure abuse
victims are protected with the fullest force of the law and that legislative
intent to create mandatory arrest statutes is reflected in statutory
language.
Part I will briefly address the policy changes effectuated in the late
twentieth century. Part II will discuss the facts, procedural background,
and Supreme Court holding in Castle Rock. Part III will provide a more
in-depth discussion of the California Task Force Report, including
suggestions the committee made to improve California's system. Part IV
will discuss policy suggestions aimed at helping government and society
more effectively combat the threat posed by domestic violence.
Castle Rock and the California Task Force Report indicate that
domestic violence victims still face serious challenges that governments
and courts are not fully aware of and not effectively addressing."
Legislatures must make systemic changes to how the courts and law
enforcement approach victims of domestic violence. Victims must feel
supported and protected by the government. They should no longer have
to live with the fear that society will turn a blind eye and allow their
8. See infra Part I1.A-B.
9. See, e.g., Dierenger & Grose, supra note 6, at 557-58; Karan & Stampalia, supra note 6, at 79;
Addison, supra note 6, at 29 (discussing incidents of abusers terrorizing their victims).
so. See infra Part I (providing a brief overview of systemic governmental reforms implemented in
the late twentieth century). See generally Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle
for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 1657, 1661-76 (providing a more in-
depth discussion of the societal approach to domestic violence issues).
t i. See infra Parts II.D, Il.A-B.
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batterers to continue to perpetrate acts of shocking violence against
them. This means the family justice system at all levels-lawyers, social
workers, police officers, judges, and the community as a whole-must
have a greater awareness of issues facing domestic violence victims. The
system's piecemeal approach to reform is illustrated by how victims are
forced to navigate the complex and resistant legal structure to receive
remedial assistance, including police protection, divorces, and assistance
with housing and job training. Rather than create roadblocks at every
turn, the family justice system must be user friendly so the people who
rely on it as a matter of life or death are able to avail themselves of its
benefits effectively.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE POLICY AND ATTITUDE CHANGE
TOWARD DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A. PRE-TWENTIETH CENTURY ATrITUDES AND THE REFORMS OF THE 1970s
Government did not mount aggressive efforts to address the
problem of domestic violence until the late twentieth century.'2 At its
founding, the United States adopted the British common law attitude
that men owned their wives, and because women amounted to nothing
more than property, men could discipline their wives as they wished
without worrying about state interference. 3 In the nineteenth century,
with the adoption of the Married Women's Property Acts, states moved
away from the view of women as property,'4 and by 192o all states had
criminalized spousal abuse.'5 However, the feminist movement during the
i96os and 1970s served as the true catalyst for legislative reforms
addressing domestic violence that are present in today's family justice
system.
6
In the 1970s states began implementing civil restraining order
policies preventing or restricting abusers' further contact with their
victims.' 7 Further, states implemented emergency ex parte relief for
victims, providing protection between the filing and trial periods of
separation proceedings; policies making protections permanent after
divorce is finalized; and procedures to institute contempt proceedings
against restraining order violators. 8
12. See, e.g., Sack, supra note Io, at 1666-67; Marion Wanless, Note, Mandatory Arrest: A Step
Toward Eradicating Domestic Violence, But Is It Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 536.
13. See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles
of Prosecutors, Judges and the Court System, I I YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 9-1O (1999).
i4. See id. at io-iI.
15. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions, to9 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1857 (1996).
16. See Sack, supra note o, at 1666-67.
17. Epstein, supra note 13, at 11, 12 n.45.
i8. Id. at 11-12.
[Vol. 58:387
December 2006] BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE
B. REFORMS GEARED TOWARD ARREST POLICIES AND
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
In the I980s, states began changing arrest policies to mandate
greater police involvement in incidents of domestic violence.9 Legislative
changes included permitting warrantless arrests and giving police more
flexibility to arrest if the officer is present when violence occurs."
Further, states started to implement mandatory arrest policies,
effectively removing police discretion as to whether to arrest abusers
when called to domestic disputes.2' The rise of mandatory arrest policies
occurred because police frequently refused to step in to or even respond
to domestic violence complaints.22 In fact, police training manuals
explicitly instructed police to attempt to mediate domestic disputes:
The police role in a [domestic] dispute situation [is] more often that of
a mediator and peacemaker than enforcer of the law.... Normally,
officers should adhere to the policy that arrests shall be avoided....
but when one of the parties demands arrest, you should attempt to
explain the ramifications of such action (e.g., loss of wages, bail
procedures, court appearances) and encourage the parties to reason
with each other. 3
Prior to the implementation of mandatory arrest policies, women
had to combat not only their abusers but also law enforcement officials.
When women called police asking for protection from their abusers,
police arrived and tried to defuse tense situations by essentially
attempting to convince the victims they should not ask for the
government's help.4 Discretionary arrest and police mediation policies
were two of many ways law enforcement "brushed off" domestic
violence victims.25 Prior to the influx of mandatory arrest polices, studies
indicated that only five percent of domestic violence complaints as a
whole and fewer than fifteen percent of domestic violence complaints
where police found a visibly injured victim resulted in arrest.6
By 2003, more than twenty jurisdictions had instituted mandatory
arrest procedures. 7 Mandatory arrest policies do not completely
eliminate police discretion because police are still required to find
evidence sufficient to establish probable cause that abuse occurred
19. Sack, supra note IO, at 1668-72.
20. Id. at 1668-69.
21. Id. at I669-7o.
22. Epstein, supra note 13, at 13-14.
23. Id. at 14 (alterations in original) (quoting OAKLAND, CAL., POLICE DEP'T, TRAINING BULLETIN
ON TECHNIQUES OF DISPUTE INTERVENTION (1975)).
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. Sack, supra note 1o, at 1670.
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before they are required to make an arrest.s However, once probable
cause is established, officers' ability to make judgment calls is curtailed. 9
Given the low numbers of abuser arrests prior to mandatory arrest
policies, the policies were needed to help shift the attitudes of law
enforcement officers. However, as Castle Rock indicates, even
mandatory arrest policies have not sufficiently educated law enforcement
officers about the need to take victims' complaints seriously. Castle Rock
police officers ignored Ms. Gonzales's numerous phone calls and
requests for assistance-in fact, one of the officers went to dinner rather
than responding." The officers' failure to take the threat seriously
resulted in the murder of a woman's three children.3
Merely making an arrest and forcing abusers to spend an evening in
jail proved an incomplete remedy, because a significant disconnect
existed between the number of batterer arrests and batterer
prosecutions. Prosecutors failed to prosecute abusers for several
reasons, including prosecutorial discretion, victims' failure to cooperate
with the process, and requests that prosecutors drop charges.3 In
response to this disconnect, prosecutors' offices and state legislatures
implemented or endorsed so-called "no-drop" policies where prosecutors
proceeded with cases regardless of the victim's willingness to
participate.' 4
"No-drop" policies were beneficial for several reasons. First, police
were more likely to make arrests if they believed abusers would be
prosecuted. 5 Further, because the prosecution did not depend on victim
participation, abusers were less able to intimidate their victims into
dropping the charges. 36  Arguably, "no-drop" policies brought
prosecutorial procedures in line with police department procedures,
creating more unity in law enforcement's approach to domestic violence
cases, and sending a message of at least reduced tolerance toward
domestic abuse. Studies indicated jurisdictions implementing mandatory
arrest and "no-drop" prosecution policies increased prosecutions,
lowered recidivism, and, to a certain extent, increased victim
involvement in prosecutions.37
The policy changes of the late twentieth century, however, have not
28. Wanless, supra note 12, at 544.
29. See id.
30. G. Kristian Miccio, Exiled From the Province of Care: Domestic Violence, Duty and
Conceptions of State Accountability, 37 RUTGERS L.J. I I I, 114 (2005).
3. Making the Court's Protection Real, supra note i.
32. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 13, at 15; Hanna, supra note 15, at 186o-6i.
33. Hanna, supra note 15, at i86o-6i.
34. Sack, supra note to, at 1672.
35. Id. at 1673.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1673-74 & nn.85-86; see also Epstein, supra note 13, at 15-6.
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solved the domestic violence problem. Victims continue to face obstacles
when they try to escape their abusers, even in jurisdictions where
legislatures have implemented mandatory arrest policies and other
reforms." More prophylactic remedies must be implemented, perhaps
geared more toward social services for victims and treatment for abusers,
to combat violent cycles and effect real change for the people caught in
violent situations-both abusers and the abused. Castle Rock provides a
graphic reminder of the many obstacles that confront victims who try to
escape their abusers.
II. CASTLE ROCK: A SUBSTANTIVE OVERVIEW AND
REFLECTIONS ON THE CASE OUTCOME
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In the early morning of June 23, 1999, police shot and killed Simon
Gonzales as he sprayed the Castle Rock, Colorado, police station with
bullets.39 When police approached the vehicle Mr. Gonzales drove to the
police station, officers discovered the bodies of Mr. Gonzales's young
children in the cab of his truck.'0 A month earlier, state courts granted
Mr. Gonzales's estranged wife, Jessica Gonzales, a restraining order
instructing Mr. Gonzales not to "molest or disturb the peace of [Ms.
Gonzales or her children],"4' and to stay at least one hundred yards away
from Ms. Gonzales and her children, except during parenting visits
scheduled for alternate weekends, two weeks during the summer, and
mid-week dinners scheduled with "reasonable notice.
4
On June 22, 1999, between 5:0o p.m. and 5:30 p.m., Mr. Gonzales
abducted the three girls while the children were playing in their yard.43
He had not obtained Ms. Gonzales's prior consent to be with the
children and therefore was in violation of the restraining order." When
Ms. Gonzales discovered her daughters were missing around 7:30 p.m.,
she contacted Castle Rock police, informed them she suspected her
estranged husband took the children, and requested that officers enforce
her restraining order.4' Officers refused to do anything at that time and
suggested that Ms. Gonzales call back in a few hours.' At 8:30 p.m. Mr.
Gonzales called Ms. Gonzales and informed her that he was with their
38. See infra Part III.A-C.
39. Jason Blevins, Dad Attacks Police, Dies, DENVER POST, June 24, 1999, at Ai.
40. Id.
41. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125. S. Ct. 2796, 28oo-o (2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
42. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 6-7, Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (No. 04 -278).
43. Id. at 7.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 7-8.
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children at a Denver amusement park.47 At that time, Ms. Gonzales again
contacted police, informed them where her husband and children were,
and requested that they enforce the restraining order, which officers
again refused to do. 8 During the next five hours, Ms. Gonzales made
three more calls and a trip to the Castle Rock police station. At each
point, police refused to take affirmative steps to enforce her restraining
order.49 And at 3:25 a.m. the situation ended in tragedy-Ms. Gonzales's
husband had murdered their three children. °
Simon Gonzales purchased the gun he used to murder his children
earlier in the evening from a private gun dealer who occasionally sold
firearms from his home." While the dealer conducted the required
background check with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National
Instant Criminal Background Check System the Gonzales children
played in the dealer's yard. 2 Mr. Gonzales failed to disclose the
restraining order issued against him.53 The background check cleared Mr.
Gonzales's handgun purchase because the FBI's database is designed to
screen for people actually convicted of domestic violence, not just those
with restraining orders issued against them." Further, the FBI database is
less comprehensive than state databases such as the one operated by the
Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which receives notice of
restraining orders immediately after state courthouses enter the
information in their computer systems.5 Prior to May 1999, the CBI ran
the background checks required for firearm purchases, but as of July
1999, the FBI had assumed the task of conducting the checks. 6
According to the CBI, had it conducted the background check, the
restraining order against Mr. Gonzales would have blocked the gun
sale.57
B. THE DISTRICT COURT DISMISSAL AND THE TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
Distressed by the police department's failure to enforce her
restraining order, Ms. Gonzales filed a lawsuit in federal district court
naming the City of Castle Rock and several of its police officers as
47. Id. at 8.
48. Id.
49. Id.
5o . Blevins, supra note 39.
51. Kirk Mitchell & Marilyn Robinson, Girls Played While Dad Bought Gun, DENVER POST, June
25, 1999, at AI.
52. Id.
53. M.E. Sprengelmeyer, Restraining Order Didn't Block Gun Buy, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, June 25, 1999, at 5A.
54. Mitchell & Robinson, supra note 5i.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. See Sprengelmeyer, supra note 53.
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defendants? Under 42 U.S.C. § I983,' 9 Ms. Gonzales alleged the police
deprived her of her procedural and substantive due process rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 60 The district court granted
defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding Ms. Gonzales had failed to
sufficiently allege violations of either her procedural or substantive due
process rights.61
Ms. Gonzales appealed the district court's decision to the Tenth• - 62
Circuit Court of Appeals. A three-judge panel affirmed the district
court's decision regarding the substantive due process claim, but reversed
the decision regarding the procedural due process claim. 3 On the issue of
a substantive due process violation, the court found that DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services6, controlled, holding
that the Due Process Clause did not require that "the State protect the
life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasions by private
actors.61
However, the court concluded that Ms. Gonzales successfully
alleged a violation of her procedural due process rights, determining that
the Colorado statute prescribing police enforcement duties with regard
to restraining orders made enforcement of such orders mandatory.
6
Because the statute mandated police action of some sort, police inaction
deprived Ms. Gonzales of her entitlement to have the restraining order
enforced.6'
In a rehearing en banc, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the three judge
panel's central finding, concluding Ms. Gonzales successfully alleged a
58. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3 d 1258, I26O (ioth Cir. 2002), vacated en banc, 366
F.3d 1093 (Ioth Cir. 2004), rev'd, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except
that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.").
60. Castle Rock, 307 F.3d at 126o.
61. Id. at 126o-61.
62. Id. at 1261.
63. Id. at 1261, 1263.
64. 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that social workers did not violate a mother's substantive due
process rights whey they failed to investigate reports of child abuse that ultimately resulted in severe
brain damage to the child).
65, Castle Rock, 307 F.3 d at 1262 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Id. at 1265 ("[Tlhe governing statute provides that an officer shall ... enforce an order and
shall arrest a restrained person [with probable cause].").
67. See id. at 1266.
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violation of her procedural due process rights.6 According to the
decision, independent sources such as state legislatures, not the United
States Constitution, create and define property rights.6 The court
determined DeShaney's holding only addressed the constitutional right
to police protection from third parties in the abstract and did not
preclude procedural due process claims in instances where a state
affirmatively granted an "entitlement" to governmental protection.7' The
court found that the language on the actual restraining order and similar
statutory language in Colorado's mandatory arrest statute meant that
once police found probable cause to believe a restraining order is being
violated, they were required to arrest the violator or at least employ
"reasonable means to enforce the restraining order."7' The court also
pointed to the legislative history of Colorado's mandatory arrest statute
as indicating lawmakers intended to "really attack the domestic violence
problems," force "the entire criminal justice system [to] act in a
consistent manner," and mandate that police "make probable cause
arrests."7 Because police failed to take any action at all to ensure Ms.
Gonzales's entitlement to police protection based on the restraining
order, the court concluded she successfully alleged a procedural due
process claim.73
The court further determined the individual police officers named in
the lawsuit were entitled to qualified immunity because the
constitutionally-protected property interest created by the restraining
order combined with legislative language mandating its enforcement did
not amount to a "clearly established" right.74 However, the Town of
Castle Rock was not immune because municipalities cannot claim
immunity from suit under the qualified immunity doctrine.75 The Town
subsequently petitioned for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court.
76
68. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3 d 1093, 1117 (Ioth Cir. 2004) (en banc).
69. Id. at io99 (citing Bd. of Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1989)).
70. Id. (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 n.2 (1989)).
71. Id. at 1104-05.
72. Id. at I I07-o8 (citation omitted). Subsequent interviews with the bill sponsors support this
finding of legislative intent. See Diane Carman, Castle Rock Ruling Needs a Response, DENVER POST,
July 5, 2005, at B t. This Colorado legislation, passed in 1994, was part of a legislative trend during the
I98os and 199os designed to address "widespread police under-enforcement" of restraining orders.
Sarah M. Buel, If Courts and Police Refuse to Protect Us, Where Will We Turn?, KANSAS CrrY STAR,
July 1O, 2005, at B7.
73. Castle Rock, 366 F.3d at III7.
74. Id. at 1ii8.
75. Id.
76. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005) (No.
04-278).
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C. THE SUPREME COURT REVERSES THE TENTH CIRCUIT
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit
judgment, holding that Ms. Gonzales did not have a property interest in
the enforcement of her restraining order, and therefore police inaction
did not violate her due process rights.77 In the 7-2 decision, written by
Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court concluded the language in the statute
and on the face of the restraining order did not create an entitlement to
police action, and even if there were such an entitlement, it did not
amount to a constitutionally-protected property interest. 78
The Court found that both precedent and history supported police
discretion even when statutes appeared to mandate police action.79 "[A]
true mandate of police action would require some stronger indication
from the Colorado Legislature than 'shall use every reasonable means to
enforce a restraining order. . . ."'8' The Court said it was
[h]ard to imagine that a Colorado peace officer would not have some
discretion to determine that-despite probable cause to believe a
restraining order has been violated-the circumstances of the violation
or the competing duties of that officer or his agency counsel decisively
against enforcement in a particular instance."
The words "shall arrest ... or ... seek a warrant" and "shall use
every reasonable means to enforce" make police action no more
mandatory than statutes providing that police "shall" pursue fleeing
suspects; there remains an element of officer discretion in determining
how to execute the laws."' Because police were unsure of the violator's
location, the most officers could have done was to seek a warrant for the
violator's arrest.83 Then a judge still had discretion as to whether to issue
the warrant, and police had the discretion to decide when to arrest the
violator. 84
The Court further determined that even if Ms. Gonzales were
entitled to mandatory police protection, that entitlement did not amount
to a property interest.8' Rather, the supposed property interest was
incidental to the always-existing government function of arresting
suspects when there is probable cause to believe they committed a
crime. s6 Direct benefits were property rights entitled to due process
protection, and because any enforcement entitlement attached to the
77. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 281o-1I.
78. Id. at 2805-o6, io.
79. See id. at 2806 (citing Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 62 n.22 (1999)).
80. Id. at 28o6.
8i. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 2808.
85. Id. at 2809.
86. Id.
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restraining order was only incidental, it was not covered within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause. 7
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the lone dissenting opinion, in
which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined."' Justice Stevens criticized the
majority for failing to afford traditional deference to federal district and
appellate court interpretations of state laws in their districts. 89 Justice
Stevens said the en banc decision that statutory terms "shall arrest" and
"shall use every reasonable means to enforce" mandated police response
was at least a plausible construction of the statute.' Thus, the majority
should have done more to demonstrate the decision was "clearly wrong"
rather than just rejecting the construction.9' Further, Justice Stevens
suggested if the Court were skeptical of the Tenth Circuit determination,
it would be better to certify the question to the Colorado Supreme Court
and afford it a chance to construe the meaning of its state's law.92
Absent appropriate deference, Justice Stevens wrote, the Court
erred in its analysis, and Colorado clearly intended to eliminate police
discretion and mandate enforcement of restraining orders.93 Justice
Stevens pointed to the articulated statutory purpose to eliminate police
discretion in the enforcement of restraining orders, interpreting
analogous statutes in other jurisdictions mandating police enforcement as
additional support that Colorado intended to take away the police
"discretion to do nothing."'94 Because Colorado established this
entitlement, Justice Stevens concluded it was reasonable to protect it as a
property interest, acknowledging that such a property interest is novel,
but no more novel than the domestic violence statutes giving rise to the
property interest.95
D. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE POLICY
The holding in Castle Rock illuminates the many dangerous
problems still facing domestic violence victims and their advocates. In
spite of the decades of progress, victims and their advocates still confront
a response by governmental officials who refuse to take the threat of
domestic violence seriously. While public policy arguments support both
sides of the Castle Rock debate, the Court's majority fails to recognize
the life-threatening reality facing domestic violence victims on a daily
87. Id. at 28IO.
88. Id. at 2813 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2814.
90. Id.
9i. See id.
92. Id. at 2815.
93. Id. at 2822.
94. Id. at 2818, 2819-20.
95. Id. at 2822-23.
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basis.
Traditionally, state tort law does not make _police liable for
negligence in failing to protect the general public. However, some
jurisdictions recognize an affirmative duty for police to protect citizens
with whom the state has a special relationship.97 As the Court's majority
suggested, cases have indicated states can create a duty for police to
protect, and states have done so in several situations, including in the
domestic violence context.0 Arguably, Colorado law created a state tort
action for situations such as Ms. Gonzales's, 9 and she could have sued
under state law without implicating constitutional due process theory."
It has been suggested that police should be bound by a duty to
protect the general public.' 1 However, the traditional tort theory of no
general police duty to protect is premised on the notion that law
enforcement agencies have limited money and resources, and should be
afforded discretion in determining how best to allocate those resources. 102
Furthermore, regardless of a decision as to which types of crime should
be and are a priority, limited law enforcement resources are not best
spent defending against potential litigation rather than putting more
officers on the streets."°
Even in light of reasonable public policy justifications for protecting
law enforcement from tort liability, Castle Rock creates a dangerous
precedent, potentially causing a reversion to attitudes prevalent prior to
the domestic violence reform movement of the late twentieth century. 4
The Supreme Court's Castle Rock holding sends a message that law
enforcement can and should use its discretion in determining whether to
arrest and prosecute domestic violence cases.' 5 A system allowing such
96. JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS § 8.o2(B)(2)(c)(i) (2d ed. 2000).
97. See id. & nn.66-68.
98. See Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2810 & n.I 5 (citations omitted); see also Sorichetti by Sorichetti
v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 70, 71-74, 77 (N.Y. 1985) (affirming multimillion dollar jury verdict
awarded to mother and child when police negligently failed to prevent the father from assaulting his
child); DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 96, § 8.o2(B)(2)(c)(i).
99. See COLO. REVISED STATUTES § 24-ioi-18(2)(a) (2005) ("[No governmental immunity may be
asserted if] the act or omission causing such injury was willful and wanton .... ").
i00. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 281o n.15 (suggesting such a theory of recovery under Colorado tort
law).
Ioi. See Miccio, supra note 3o , at 186-91; see also Liliya Abramchayev, Note, A Social Contract
Argument for the State's Duty to Protect From Private Violence, 18 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 849,
874 (2004).
1O2. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 96, § 8.o2(B)(2)(c)(i) (quoting Riss v. City of New York, 240
N.E.2d 86o, 861 (N.Y. 1968)).
103. See id.
lO4. See supra Part I.A-C.
1O5. See generally Michael Mattis, Survey, Protection Orders: A Procedural Pacifier or a
Vigorously Enforced Protection Tool?, 82 DENY. U. L. REV. 519, 519, 536-37 (2005) (arguing that the
ioth Circuit en banc opinion's implications were positive because it sent a message that the courts, and
the government as a whole took the dangerous threat of domestic violence seriously).
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discretion opens the door to arbitrary enforcement because it depends on
law officers' making subjective determinations of seriousness, thus
permitting a return to the time when abuse victims were not taken
seriously.
Castle Rock's outcome reasonably attempts to preserve police
resources and traditional tort doctrines recognizing police discretion.
However, to combat the decision's potential ramifications, states must
now take affirmative measures to recognize and address domestic
violence as a dangerous problem, and law enforcement must take
domestic violence victims seriously. Public policy would be best served
by a new push to alter societal attitudes toward domestic violence. If
affirmative steps are taken to correct serious systemic breakdowns,
victims will not merely be forced to rely on after-the-fact civil litigation,
and the government can take proactive measures to eradicate the
domestic violence problem.
III. CALIFORNIA'S REPORT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
GOVERNMENT COULD Do BETTER' 06
Sporadic and problematic police enforcement of domestic violence
restraining orders is not a problem unique to Castle Rock, Colorado, and
sadly, Ms. Gonzales is not the only woman to experience tragic and
horrifying violence at the hands of an abuser."° In California,
approximately 620,000 women suffer abuse at the hands of an intimate
partner each year.'" In 2003, almost fifty-five percent of the 194,000 calls
to California law enforcement requesting help with domestic violence
altercations involved abusers who had weapons.'
In June 2005, California Attorney General Bill Lockyer released an
extensive, two-year study outlining lapses in the state's procedures for
protecting victims and enforcing domestic violence restraining orders."'
The Task Force was comprised of a cross-section of law enforcement,
legislators, judges, health care professionals, and members of social
service organizations."' Charged with examining restraining orders,
prosecutors' offices, batterer intervention programs, and health
practitioner reporting, the Task Force investigated ten counties,
including urban and rural locations; questioned nearly three hundred
io6. This section contains a discussion of the California Task Force Report and Task Force
Executive Summary findings, which followed a two-year investigation. The report in its entirety is
nearly 120 pages. For the purposes of this Note, I will limit the discussion to relevant areas and
pertinent findings, in light of facts giving rise to the Castle Rock litigation. This is by no means
intended as a comprehensive evaluation of the California Task Force Report findings.
107. See sources cited supra note 6.
io8. CALIFORNIA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at i I (citation omitted).
io9. See id. at 11-12.
I to. TASK FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 6, at 1-5.
I I i. See CALIFORNIA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at iii-iv.
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experts and providers; and heard testimony from sixty-nine "testifiers" at
public hearings."'
A. PROBLEMATIC PRACTICES INVOLVING RESTRAINING ORDERS
Californians can obtain domestic violence restraining orders in one
of two ways."3 First, criminal courts can issue criminal protective orders
during the domestic violence prosecutorial process."4 Second, California
family courts can issue emergency protective orders when law
enforcement responds to a domestic altercation; temporary restraining
orders are issued ex parte upon reasonable proof of previous domestic
violence (pending hearing on the issuance of a permanent restraining
order), and permanent restraining orders are issued after a hearing."'
Once restraining orders are issued, law enforcement officials can enforce
them only if the officials establish that the order was issued and is
currently valid, the offending party was notified of the order via service
of process, and the order actually prohibits the misconduct in question." 
6
California maintains a database of restraining orders issued in family
and criminal courts, so that law enforcement officials can access the
information they need to enforce the orders."7 However, criminal and
family courts have different procedures and requirements for entering
restraining orders into the database.",8 This results in disturbing delays in
the inputting of restraining orders issued in family courts.' '9 Furthermore,
counties determine their own procedures for inputting restraining orders,
resulting in variance in the amount of time inputting takes, as well as
variance as to which department bears the burden for actually entering
the orders.'20
Lack of timely reporting and failure to properly maintain databases
contributed to the tragic outcome in Castle Rock. Had Ms. Gonzales's
I -straining order been reported to the FBI database, her husband would
have been prohibited from purchasing the gun he used to murder his
children.'2' California's failure to maintain a central database of
restraining orders is disturbing, and, as the California Task Force
112. TASK FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 6, at I.
113. See CALIFORNIA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 17-18.
114. Id. at 17.
115. Id. at 17-18.
116. Id. at 18.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 19. Criminal courts must enter restraining orders within "one business day," whereas
family courts must enter the restraining orders "immediately" but do not have a mandated timetable
defining "immediately." Id.
1 i9. TASK FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 6, at 2.
I20. See CALIFORNIA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at i9.
121. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
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Executive Summary suggests, the problems must be addressed.'22 Not
only will failures pertaining to database inputting and maintenance
potentially allow abusers access to firearms, as in Castle Rock, but under
California's system domestic violence victims may. not even get valid
restraining orders enforced because police will not have access to the
information they need to arrest violators.'
2 3
The California Task Force Report identified several problematic
areas where procedural requirements made it systemically more difficult
for abuse victims to obtain assistance and protection.' 4 California places
a significant burden on victims by forcing them to complete lengthy,
complex legal forms to obtain a restraining order.'25 However, according
to the California Task Force Report, four of the ten counties included in
the survey failed to provide free legal assistance to battered women to
help them navigate through the complicated procedural hoops.I"6
Furthermore, once women completed the forms, some were forced to go
before judges who appeared hostile and skeptical of the victims' claims. 7
Additionally, law enforcement and victims' services are often spread out,
making it difficult for battered women, who often have young children,
to physically move from location to location to access the resources they
desperately need.28
B. PROSECUTORIAL SHORTCOMINGS AND HOLDING BATERERS
ACCOUNTABLE
Many California counties have problematic policies in place for
prosecuting domestic violence offenses.' 9 Seven of the ten California
counties studied used inexperienced attorneys to prosecute most
domestic violence cases, even though such cases can often be difficult to
navigate.'3 ° Furthermore, California counties sometimes fail to send
prosecutors to arraignments, frequently due to staffing shortages.'3 ' The
California Task Force Report also revealed abusers' sentences varied
significantly, with some offenders failing to receive the statutory
122. See TASK FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 6, at 2; see also infra Part IV.
123. See CALIFORNIA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at I8.
124. See, e.g., id. at 3, 9 (describing current requirements that the victim deliver copies of the
restraining order to all law enforcement agencies and serve the order on the batterer).
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 9 (suggesting that prosecutors' offices work with social service agencies to provide more
supportive responses to domestic violence victims).
129. Id. at 49-57.
130. Id. at 50-51 (identifying complicating factors such as hostile and uncooperative victims, law
enforcement officers who perform incomplete initial investigations, hostile and skeptical judges, and
system participants who do not understand the nuances of the abuser/abused relationship).
131. Id. at 52.
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minimum sentence. 32
California has a program allowing judges to give batterers
rehabilitation-centered sentences rather than merely incarcerating
them.' 3  The most recent version of the program requires that abusers
who are convicted of domestic violence and sentenced to probation
attend two-hour counseling sessions for at least fifty-two weeks.'
34
Unfortunately, the Task Force discovered that some prosecutorial
offices allow domestic violence offenders to plead to lesser offenses.'35 As
a result, judges impose shorter sentences and probationary periods than
those statutorily mandated, and sentences do not always include
participation in the fifty-two week program.' 36 Further, those who are
actually sentenced to attend the programs do not complete the required
number of classes, and prosecutors take few steps to enforce the
sentences.'37 Program coordinators, who are in charge of tracking
attendance, often permit multiple absences and fail to report absent
participants to the courts or prosecutors.'
C. SAN FRANCISCO STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REACHES
SIMILAR CONCLUSIONS
A 2006 report studying domestic violence in San Francisco
confirmed many of the California Attorney General's conclusions about
deficiencies in the government's response to domestic violence.'39 The
report was partially funded by the Department of Justice's Office of
Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, and examined police
officers', investigators', and prosecutors' responses to domestic violence
reports in San Francisco.'4° The San Francisco report used data from the
San Francisco Police Department's Domestic Violence Response Unit
(DVRU) and Crime Analysis Unit to evaluate the governmental
response to domestic violence, with an emphasis on the impact domestic
violence has on children.'4' According to that data, during a two-year
timeframe police received more than 16,ooo calls reporting incidents of
domestic violence, meaning San Francisco police officers responded to a
132. Id. at 53; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.097(a) (West 2005) (providing statutory minimum
sentences).
133. See CALIFORNIA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 58-59 (describing "treatment"
programs).
134. Id. at 59.
135. Id. at 64 (describing the practice of allowing batterers to plead guilty to assault or trespass).
136. See id. at 52-53.
137. See id. at 65-66.
138. Id. at 67-68.
139. JOHN P. SHIELDS, I TRIED TO STOP THEM: CHILDREN'S EXPOSURE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN SAN
FRANCISCO (2oo6), available at http://www.adp.cahwnet.gov/DV/o6SFPDReport.pdf.
140. Id. at 2, 8.
141. Id.
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domestic violence complaint once every ninety minutes. 142
While data suggest San Francisco's arrest rates for domestic violence
have increased, DVRU data show only thirty-two percent of felony
domestic violence incidents reported to the office are actually formally
investigated. 4 3 Approximately ten percent of cases are not investigated
because they are misdemeanor offenses, which are handled by the San
Francisco District Attorney's office.'" However, the remaining cases are
not investigated because of a lack of evidence or victims who are
unwilling to assist investigators.4 A decreasing number of DVRU
investigators also contribute to the lack of in-depth investigations.' 46 The
San Francisco District Attorney formally charges accused abusers in
forty-four percent of the cases the DVRU investigates. 47 This means
abusers are formally charged in only fourteen percent of felony domestic
violence incidents forwarded to the DVRU for investigation.'48
The San Francisco study's primary focus was on how domestic
violence affects children.'4  However, the report reached similar
conclusions to the California Attorney General's finding that failing to
investigate domestic violence incidents and underenforcement of
domestic violence laws makes victims less likely to seek government
help.'50 Because of such underenforcement and victims' reactions to the
government's inattentiveness, the "inescapable conclusion" is that
government is not adequately protecting domestic violence victims."'
Theoretically, active and successful domestic violence prosecutions
will encourage victims to come forward, show abusers their behavior will
not be tolerated, and send the message that society takes domestic
violence issues seriously. Further, counseling and rehabilitation programs
afford the state an opportunity to break the domestic violence cycle, and
to potentially modify abusers' behavior. However, if prosecutors lack the
tools to successfully prosecute domestic violence cases, and courts do not
enforce sentences and require abusers to seek help, the system's
resources will be unable to work effectively to protect victims.
142. Id. at 9.
143. Id. at 17, 20.
i44. Id. at 20.
145. Id.
146. Id. (noting the DVRU had twenty investigators in 2002, but employed only ten investigators
at the time the study was released).
147. Id. at 2I.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 8.
i5o. Id. at 22; see TASK FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 6, at 2-8 (describing the problems
with current domestic violence enforcement in California).
151. SHIELDS,supra note 139, at 23.
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IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES TARGETING RESTRAINING
ORDERS AND SYSTEMIC REFORMS
In the past thirty years, governments have made significant changes
to their policies and prooedures pertaining to domestic violence.
However, most reforms have been piecemeal,'52 and the results are
simply not as effective as they could have been. As evidenced by Castle
Rock and the California Task Force Report, there remain significant
breakdowns in current systems that cause abuse victims additional and
preventable emotional and physical harm.'53
Several key improvements can be made to the restraining order
system to make order enforcement more efficient and effective. For
example, a central database is needed that provides uniform data
collection and data input procedures to provide up-to-date and accurate
information to law enforcement officials nationwide. This will ensure
that law enforcement will have the most accurate information possible
when they are asked to enforce restraining orders. Further, and perhaps
more importantly, systemic changes are necessary to address
fundamental problems with prosecutorial practices and access to
resources. Tools exist to help victims fight their abusers; however, the
system has erected barriers that make seeking assistance considerably
more difficult than it needs to be. Moreover, there are too many people
whose jobs are to protect domestic violence victims-police officers,
prosecutors, and judges, for example-who do not fully understand the
nuanced and unique issues pervasive in domestic violence litigation.
A. POTENTIAL REFORMS DEDICATED TO RESTRAINING ORDER
SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES
i. National Database of Restraining Orders that States and Local
Officials Must Update Daily
Once restraining orders are issued, they are virtually useless unless
law enforcement know about the existence of the order and the order's
parameters so officers are able to respond appropriately should a
domestic violence victim request that an order be enforced. Efficient
enforcement is essential for restraining orders to be an effective
deterrent to domestic violence.'54  Indeed, "'an order without
enforcement at best offers scant protection and at worst increases the
victim's danger by creating a false sense of security.""55 In Castle Rock,
the abuser purchased the gun he used to murder his children despite the
152. See supra Part I.
153. See supra Parts 11-III.
154. See Epstein, supra note 13, at 12.
155. Id. at 11-12 (quoting PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION
ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE AND ENFORCEMENT 49 (1990)).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
restraining order that should have blocked the gun sale. 6 Had Colorado
courts sent updated information to the FBI database as quickly as they
transmitted information to the CBI database, Mr. Gonzales would not
have been able to legally purchase a firearm. 57 Further, the California
Task Force Report identified a key problem: that criminal courts are
required to report restraining orders within twenty-four hours of
issuance, whereas family courts are required to report orders
"immediately," but without a specific definition of "immediately"; the
report criticized criminal courts for not complying with the twenty-four
hour update requirements. 
5
Congress should create a national, centralized database to which
states can send daily reports on restraining order activities. Congress
should strongly encourage states to participate in such a database system.
In order to assure states' participation, Congress might condition federal
law enforcement dollars or funding on states' instituting the procedures
necessary to supply the federal database with accurate and immediate
information about restraining orders and other domestic violence
incidents. 59 Clearly, states recognize the importance of maintaining
central repositories of information, but the most efficient means of doing
this is to create one system upon which all law enforcement would rely.
Under such a system, law enforcement would have access to restraining
order information from other states, and third parties such as firearms
dealers could access this information. Importantly, if everyone is
required to report to and rely on information that is in the same
database, the risks of overlooking or omitting imperative information, as
was the case in Castle Rock, will be reduced.
In establishing this program, Congress must provide the FBI (or
whichever agency is in charge of overseeing and maintaining the
database) with the resources required to do the job effectively and
efficiently. This includes resources to purchase and maintain the
appropriate equipment, and the funding to hire enough skilled people to
oversee the process. Allocating sufficient funding to programs designed
to combat domestic violence will show lawmakers' commitment to
actually fighting the problem.
If there is a centralized system, to which every court must report on
a routine basis, law enforcement can be reasonably confident that they
have access to accurate, up-to-date information, and, therefore, will be
156. Sprengelmeyer, supra note 53.
157. See id.
158. See CALIFORNIA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 19, 21.
159. Conditioning federal funding on participation in this program is suggested so as to avoid
potential constitutional challenges to Congress's mandate. See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483
U.S. 203 (1987) (outlining the parameters within which Congress can condition funding on compliance
with or participation in federal programs).
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better able to enforce restraining orders. Further, such a system will
provide more protections against tragic oversights such as the one that
allowed Mr. Gonzales to purchase the gun he used to murder his
children.
2. State Legislators Should Reevaluate Their Domestic Violence
Polices for Clarity and "Truly" Mandatory Language
State legislatures must reevaluate their domestic violence laws to
assure the statutory language truly matches the legislative intent. If it
does, police will be required to take action to enforce restraining orders.
In Castle Rock, the Supreme Court concluded the Colorado Legislature
did not intend to mandate police action to arrest or issue an arrest
warrant for abusers who violate a restraining order.' 6° The Court reached
this conclusion in spite of significant legislative findings indicating the
Colorado Legislature intended to institute mandatory arrest policies for
domestic violence complaints. 6' Subsequent interviews with the
legislative sponsors of the Colorado law at issue indicate the legislators
intended to mandate police action. 6 ' The Supreme Court's holding
suggests state mandatory arrest laws are not as clear as the laws should
be in order for courts to enforce them. A reexamination would prevent
future judicial misinterpretation.
The statutory language at issue in Castle Rock said police "shall use
every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order" and that "[a]
peace officer shall arrest or, if an arrest would be impractical under the
circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of a restrained person.'
63
The Court concluded such language did not "truly [make] enforcement
of restraining orders mandatory," and police discretion exists even in
spite of "apparently mandatory arrest" laws.' 6, In order to strengthen
statutory language and create truly mandatory arrest policies, legislatures
must eliminate words that courts might interpret as equivocal.
Legislatures should also specifically consider whether statutory
language mandating domestic violence arrests should apply in restraining
order violations where the abuser is not present to be arrested.' 6' The
Castle Rock majority was seemingly concerned that Colorado's
mandatory arrest laws did not intend to mandate arrests for restraining
order violations not involving a heated altercation.' 66 If legislatures
intended mandatory arrest policies to apply in situations such as that in
16o. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2805-06 (2005).
16s. See Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1107-09 (ioth Cir. 2004) (en banc); see
also Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2817-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. Carman, supra note 72.
163. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2805 (emphasis omitted).
164. Id. (emphasis omitted from first quotation).
165. See id. at 2806-07.
166. See id. at 2805-09.
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Castle Rock, they need to expressly state that police are required to take
action to find and arrest abusers when there is probable cause to believe
the abuser is violating a restraining order, even though the abuser is not
physically present to be arrested.
Finally, legislatures should also consider, as the Supreme Court in
Castle Rock suggests, whether it is appropriate to give victims a remedy
under state tort law when police fail to enforce restraining orders. 6' As
previously discussed, there are arguments both for and against the
creation of such a duty for police to act."6 However, responsible state
legislatures should consider the possibility that victims might need such
protection to assure police take the victims seriously when restraining
orders are violated.
B. SYSTEMIC REFORMS INTENDED TO ADDRESS ALL PARTIES' ATTITUDES
TOWARD DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Domestic violence polices including mandatory arrest policies and
"no-drop" policies have probably contributed to significant changes in
attitudes toward domestic violence victims and the issue as a whole.
However, the piecemeal approach to reform has also created serious
systemic lapses that must still be addressed to achieve more effective and
responsive systems. Generally, the participants in the various stages of
the domestic violence prosecutorial process-including law enforcement
officers, prosecutors, judges, victims' rights advocates, and social service
organizations-must receive better education and training. Better
training will increase awareness of how the other parts of the domestic
violence response system work and interrelate, thus creating a more
efficient process, and will help raise awareness to all participants
regarding the issues and road blocks domestic violence victims face as
they navigate the system.
i. Proximately Located Resources Allowing Various Participants
to Work Together to Raise Awareness and Make the System
Easier for Victims to Utilize
Victims are often frustrated by disjointed systems that are intended
to assist them but not designed to be efficient or user friendly.' 69 Indeed,
the California Task Force findings indicate that a needed improvement
involves locating law enforcement, judicial, and support resources more
proximately, to more easily facilitate victims' requests for help.17
Further, research indicates victims who are able to easily access help are
more likely to feel more secure and to willingly participate in the
167. See id. at 281o & n.s5.
168. See supra Part lI.D.
169. See Epstein, supra note 13, at 20 (citing studies suggesting that women with stronger support
networks are more likely to willingly participate in the prosecutorial process).
170. See TASK FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 6, at 5, 9.
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offender's prosecution.'
The Alameda County Family Justice Center in California offers a
more user friendly approach to navigating the domestic violence system.
The Center, a so-called "one-stop-shop," offers comprehensive services
to victims and their families including legal assistance, healthcare, job
training, law enforcement intervention, and crisis support.7 ' The Center,
one of fifteen in the country founded on a $1.2 million grant from the
Department of Justice, provides the resources of seventeen agencies
including law enforcement, legal aid, local hospitals, victim support, and
child care services, all within the same building.'73 Locating so many
fundamental resources in the same building should serve to better
educate the various participants in the process, including law
enforcement, attorneys, and others. Further, this setup will create an
environment where victims will be able to get the help they need in a
relatively straightforward manner, allowing them to obtain assistance
without becoming too frustrated and bogged down in the process.
In 1999, Santa Clara County (San Jose), California, created the
Juvenile Domestic and Family Violence Court.'74 This court focused
extensive efforts toward preventing a cycle of domestic violence,
specifically directing resources toward juvenile offenders.'75 The court's
structure emphasizes a collaborative and integrated approach, including
intake processes and investigations conducted by officials who have been
specially trained to handle domestic violence cases., 6 Additionally, the
court also includes victim advocacy programs and rehabilitation
resources such as substance abuse and mental health counseling.'77
Comprehensive and integrated court systems such as those in
Alameda and Santa Clara counties are popping up throughout the
country.' However, such courts must become the standard, not the
171. See Epstein, supra note 13, at 20. Arguably, such a support system should also include law
enforcement and prosecutors who are the "frontline defenders" of victims' rights.
172. Alameda County Family Justice Ctr., Who We Are, http://www.acfjc.org/whowe-arel (last
visited Nov. 21, 2o06).
173. Kelly St. John, New Center Opens for Domestic-Violence Victims, S.F. CHRON., Sept. I, 2005,
at B4.
174. Inger Sagatun-Edwards et al., The Santa Clara County Juvenile Domestic and Family Violence
Court, 4 J. CrR. FOR FAMILIES, CHILD. & THE CTS. 91 , 92-93 (2003).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 92-93, 95.
177. Id. at 95.
178. See, e.g., Lowell D. Castleton et al., Ada County Family Violence Court: Shaping the Means to
Better the Result, 39 FAM. L.Q. 27 (2005) (discussing the evolution of Ada County (Boise), Idaho's
family court reforms intended to confront the issue of domestic violence); Amy Kosanovich, Note,
One Family in Two Courts: Coordination for Families in Illinois Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Courts, 37 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 571 (2o06) (discussing Illinois' recent experimentation with Unified
Family Courts).
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exceptional approach to addressing domestic violence.'79 If resources are
easier to access, the process will be more efficient and less frustrating for
all involved, making it more likely victims will feel safe when seeking
assistance.
2. Dedicated Domestic Violence Prosecutorial Offices and Courts
Police, prosecutors, and judges who are disinclined to interfere in a
marriage contribute to the overall attitude that ignores domestic violence
victims.' Another serious problem is the number of inexperienced
prosecutors who handle domestic violence cases.'"' Those prosecutors are
ill-equipped to deal with the complex and difficult issues facing victims.""8
The California Task Force suggests that prosecution teams that handle
domestic violence cases should be dedicated teams, exclusively handling
all domestic violence prosecutions.' s3
Implementing dedicated prosecutorial teams would allow attorneys
to become better trained and more aware of the complicated issues
confronting domestic violence cases, including victims who are
apprehensive about participating in the prosecution, the complicated
dynamic between victim and accused, law enforcement agents who do
not complete thorough initial investigations, and judges who are
potentially apprehensive toward the victim and the prosecution.' 4 When
prosecutors can dedicate themselves to domestic violence cases they will
become specialized in the area and ultimately more effective in their
roles as prosecutors.
Scholars also correctly suggest moving toward an integrated
domestic violence court system.' Ideally, a domestic violence court
could handle the criminal aspects of restraining orders, domestic violence
prosecutions, and family adjudication including divorce proceedings.
Further, the domestic violence court could oversee child custody
disputes, usually handled during the second stage of a bifurcated system
whereby battered women are confronted with judges who are unwilling
to sever the batterer's rights to the children.'8 Courts dedicated to
adjudicating domestic violence issues will have similar benefits as
179. See Epstein, supra note 13, at 23-27, 29-33 (suggesting the systemic need to coordinate the
victim intake process and citing a similar one-stop center in Washington, D.C. as a standard-bearer).
I8o. See Sarah M. Buel, Access to Meaningful Remedy: Overcoming Doctrinal Obstacles in Tort
Litigation Against Domestic Violence Offenders, 83 OR. L. REv. 945, 974-81 (2o04).
I81. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 50-51.
t82. Id.
183. Id. at 51-52.
184. See, e.g., id. at 5i.
i85. See Epstein, supra note 13, at 28-38.
186. Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding
Judicial Resistance and Imagining Solutions, II AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 657, 667-68 (2oo3)
(arguing that domestic violence courts will allow judges to become more specialized and aware of
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dedicated domestic violence prosecution units. Judges who are familiar
with and routinely handle the various aspects of domestic violence are
likely to become more educated about the issues and more sensitive to
the parties involved in the litigation. Additionally, judges who are more
educated and aware are also likely to make better-informed decisions
about abuser sentences, divorce terms, restraining order terms, and child
custody settlements, and to be less hostile toward domestic violence
victims. Further, specially-trained police officers, prosecutors, and judges
will be less inclined to believe batterers, who are often able to portray
themselves as victims who are merely trying to "save the marriage."'8
CONCLUSION
Society has significantly reformed its approach and attitude toward
domestic violence during the past thirty years. However, the Supreme
Court's decision in Castle Rock and the case itself suggest there remains
significant disconnect between the terrifying reality victims face on a
daily basis and the government's response to that reality. Research such
as the California Task Force's investigation corroborates the need to
make procedural and systemic changes to assure government is doing
everything it can to provide the best possible assistance to domestic
violence victims.
Jessica Gonzales's story is horrifying and tragic. Compounding the
tragedy is the realization that hers is not an isolated, unique story.
Domestic violence is a reality for hundreds of thousands of Americans,
and a government that fails to do its best to address such violence is
doing a disservice to all its citizens. While the complete eradication of
domestic violence is an unrealistic goal, society should not be content to
let policies remain static. There is room for significant and necessary
policy improvements. Legislatures must consider the ramifications of
Castle Rock's holding, and take appropriate measures to improve their
states' treatment of domestic violence. Society need not be content to
rest on its laurels assuming the reforms of the late twentieth century
afford victims sufficient protections.
In an era where information is at one's fingertips because of
technology and the Internet, there is simply no excuse for states' and
courts' failure to coordinate the collection and dissemination of
information about domestic violence. As a national overseer, Congress is
in a unique position to facilitate the collection of such information. States
should cooperate with a congressional effort so that every participant in
the process, from victims to law enforcement officials to judges, can feel
more secure that they have access to the most up-to-date information
and can make decisions based on a more complete understanding of
187. Buel, supra note 18o, at 977.
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individual circumstances. Cooperation is also necessary in the local
sphere, because participants in the various aspects of domestic violence
services must work more closely together to achieve a cohesive, user
friendly, and effective process of addressing the needs of domestic
violence victims.
Changes should be made to the domestic violence system. Failure to
critically evaluate procedures and systems currently in place and to at
least attempt improvements will create a dangerous complacency, which
effectively sanctions the life-threatening dangers for many Americans in
their own homes and most intimate relationships.
